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  11. Introduction 
 
 
Our experimental design deals with a twofold problem. The first task is to combine the case of 
voluntary provision of cultural goods with the possibility of investing in cultural education. As it 
will be explained in the next sections, the structure of the experiment involves the possibility for 
subjects to invest in cultural education before having to choose whether and how much of their 
initial endowment to allocate to the provision of cultural goods. In fact, we consider that 
investments in cultural education can lead to an increase in the individual sensibility to cultural 
goods consumption and, therefore, to higher levels of subjects’ contributions to the cultural goods
1. 
This view is supported by Throsby (2001, pag.114), who affirms that “it is apparent that a person 
enjoyment of music, literature, drama, the visual arts and so on and hence her willingness to spend 
money on consuming them, are importantly related to her knowledge and understandings of these 
art forms. Such cultural competence is acquired through education and experience, and hence 
stronger and more discriminating tastes for the arts are likely to be shown by better educated and by 
those who have already become consumers”. Therefore, there are two forces able to influence the 
allocation of individual endowments to the provision of cultural goods: education and previous 
consumption. In the present paper we will focus on the effects of cultural education which has been, 
according to my opinion, not fully explored yet.  
The second task is, then, to prepare an experimental setting able to cope with the well-known 
framing effects. What we want to look for is the presence, first, and the magnitude, then, of the 
switch in the experimental instructions from a neutral to a loaded wording. We will try to stress that 
fact that the use of loaded instructions can be relevant to certain experimental investigations. In 
such a case as the cultural economics, it seems to be useful to explore the effects of an increase of 
the direct knowledge of the kind of good subjects are asked to contribute to. An example of the 
positive effects of direct knowledge of the object of the experiment is the work of Paradiso and 
                                                 
1 For a theoretical explanation of this accumulation process see Finocchiaro Castro and Mazza (2001). 
  2Trisorio (2001). Therefore, we expect to assist to an increase in the subjects’ contribution levels to 
the cultural good in those in-context treatments compared with the context-free ones. Strikingly, our 
prevision about contributions to cultural goods, most of the times, has been disattended by 
experimental data. They showed only a slight difference in contributions due to the framing effects 
as it will be explained in the next sections. The present paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
reviews the relevant results coming from the literature on framing effects. Section 3 describes the 
experimental design and the theoretical predictions. Section 4 presents and discusses the results of 






2.1 Framing in Public Goods Experiments 
Before describing the state of arts regarding the results on the effects of framing in public goods 
experiments, let us explain what is commonly meant by framing. A clear and, at the same time, 
broad definition of framing can be borrowed by Elliot and Hayward (1998, pag.232). They describe 
a frame as “a framework within information is considered, selected, interpreted, evaluated or simply 
understood”. The authors go further on with their analysis stating, on the same paragraph, that 
“framing is then any manipulation of factors causing a change in an individual’s frame such that a 
predictable behaviour is affected, that predictable behaviour is a framing effect”. After an 
investigation of relevant literature, it comes out the presence of two types of framing: the pure-
framing and the valence framing. The former occurs when subjects are presented with alternative, 
although perfectly equivalent, problem wordings (see Albers and Harstad, 1991;Kashima and 
Maher, 1995). Differently, the latter refers to situation where the information is presented to the 
subjects either in a negative or in a positive light
2.  
                                                 
2 For a detailed review of pure-framing studies see Levin, Schneider and Gaeth (1998). 
  3A significant number of studies on economics and psychology have focused on the analysis of 
valence framing effects. The first and, probably, most important contribution has been the one of 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981), where they describe the well-known Asian disease problem and 
their main result, the choice reversal effect. The work of Tversky and Kahneman (1981) has been 
replicated several times to look for regularities in the results. Bohm and Lind (1992) observe that, in 
their experiment, the framing effects are noticeably smaller than in Tversky and Kahneman’s study, 
but they were still substantial and statistically significant. Other replications with real financial 
incentives are Knetsch and Sinden (1984), Kahneman and Knetsch (1992) and Bateman et al. 
(1997a, 1997b). 
If compared with the amount of works on experimental economics, rather few studies have 
investigated the effects due to valence framing in public goods experiments. An interesting attempt 
to analyze the impact of positive versus negative framing in a standard linear public goods 
experiment has been run by Andreoni (1995), finding that when the externality generated from the 
public good is positively framed subjects contribute more than when negatively framed, even if they 
face the same incentives. These results have been replicated without fully supporting Andreoni’s 
findings (Park, 2000). 
At the same time, other economic related works, confirm the presence of strong framing effects on 
cooperation. In particular, subjects show up to be more willing to cooperate when they face a 
positive framing than facing a negative framing (Sonnemans et al., 1998;Willinger and 
Ziegelmayer, 1999;Cookson, 2000). From the point of view of psychologists, the studies of valence 
framing effects on cooperation generated a huge academic production implementing hypothetical 
instead of real incentives
3. The majority of these works focusing on positive versus negative 
framing effects does not show any significant framing effects (Fleishman, 1988), while others (i.e. 
                                                 
3 As Cookson (2000) points out it may be either that hypothetical incentives increase framing effects relative to real 
incentives because of subjects cannot focus carefully on decision problems or that framing effects results in “optical 
illusions” only, preventing subjects’ to miss the point (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). 
  4Brewer and Kramer, 1986) find results contrasting with Andreoni (1995) and Sonnemans et al. 
(1998), even if implementing a common-pool resource game instead of a public good game.   
 
2.2 Context-free versus in-Context Experimental Settings 
One of the first rule to abide to when writing the instructions for an experiment is avoiding any kind 
of suggesting words. Every sentence has to be neutrally formulated in order to exclude the case for 
any expressions that may affect the behaviours of subjects. This aspect becomes particularly 
relevant when experimentalists try to model real-life situations to be checked in the laboratory. In 
fact, the attempt at replicating real-world decision problems starkly contrasts the need for an 
abstract terminology to be adopted, ending up with some difficulties in properly interpreting the 
experimental findings. Therefore, the majority of experimental studies implement a neutral and 
abstract set of instructions, although applied to real-world situations. Interesting examples of the 
effects of loaded instructions on experimental results may be taken from many different areas of 
experimental economics. Fehr, Gaechter and Kirchsteiger (1997) study the loaded instructions 
effects on labour market; Potters and van Winden (2000) analyze the impact of an in-context 
environment of lobbyists and policymakers; Weber, Keppe and Meyer-Delius (2000) find  that 
negative and positive framing of endowments affects outcome in an experimental market 
environment; Hoffman, McCabe and Smith (2000), in exchange ultimatum game experiments, use 
instructions to change an impersonal exchange situation to a personal exchange situation; Shiv, 
Edell and Payne (1997) examine the effects of negative and positive framing of advertising claims 
on consumers choices and attitudes; Bolton and Katok (1995) identify different procedure-induced 
framing effects concerning task description frames; Druckman (2001) addresses the question on 
whether providing people with certain type of additional information enables them to adapt and 
overcome framing effects; Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt (2002) present a work including one 
condition where a framing of the economic problem of corruption as a bribery experiment; finally, 
Eckel and Grossman (1996) check for the role of altruism on subjects’ decisions running a double-
  5blind dictator game replacing the subject acting as recipient during one treatment with a local 
branch of American Red Cross.  
In particular, a question emerges from this analysis, should we use the experimental methodology to 
investigate the importance and effects of context looking at it in a “positive” way? The same doubt 
is pointed out by Loomes (1999, pag.39) “it may be more useful to try to study the impact of 
context than to pursue the impossible goal of eliminating it”. According to us, this problem seems 
to be even more in the need of an answer when social and cultural factors as well as other-regarding 
behaviour matter. 
 
2.3 The Public Good Nature of Culture 
In the last decades economists seem to concern more and more about the link between the 
preservation and restoration of historical buildings, the level of cultural good and the economic 
theory (Champarnaud et al., 2002; Fryer, 2002; van der Ploeg, 2002). One of the first puzzles to be 
solved by the economists trying to apply the main tools of economic theory to cultural matters has 
been the definition of cultural good. Given that the aim of the present work is not the solution to 
this puzzling question, we will consider only the “public good” nature of cultural goods, which is, 
by the way, one of the most widely mentioned characteristic among the cultural economics 
literature.  
The main effect coming from the public good nature of cultural goods is the presence of positive 
externality for the whole society when these goods are provided (Scandizzo, 1992; Mazza, 1993; 
Throsby, 1994; Pethig and Cheng, 2000;Finocchiaro Castro and Mazza, 2001). As it has been noted 
by Trimarchi (1993), even if cultural goods possess clearly the characteristic of non-rivalry in 
consumption, they may cause problems of congestion
4. At the same time, cultural goods hardly 
show to possess the characteristic of non-excludability, given that it seems technically doable and 
economically convenient to implement mechanisms of consumption exclusion. Differently, Mazza 
                                                 
4 For example congestion may occur in the case of cultural events taking place in museums or concert halls. 
  6(1993, pag.37) points out that “Although cultural goods may be rival in consumption, it is often 
suggested that they produce ‘national feeling’ benefits which are non-excludable”. A similar 
opinion is the one pursued by Mossetto (1993, pag.96) who describes the ambiguous role of artistic 
goods saying that “artistic goods are endowed with non-excludability even if the consumption is 
sometimes rival”. However, we will consider the provision of cultural goods at a social level in 
order to be able to include both of the characteristics of non-rivalry and non-excludability into the 




3. Experimental Design and Predictions 
 
3.1 The Design 
The experiment described in this paper involves two conditions, each of them played twice. The 
two conditions are called, respectively, context-free and cultural-context and each of them is 
composed by two treatments. The first treatment is a standard public good game with participants 
divided into five groups of four players and is the same for both conditions. All subjects are 
endowed with six tokens. They have to decide about the allocation of their endowment between two 
projects A and B. Each token placed in project A (xi) earns one Experimental Currency (EC) for the 
subject. Differently, each token allocated to project B (gi) gives the exactly the same payoff to every 
member of the group as showed by the second term of the left member of equation (1). In particular, 
the marginal per-capita return from the tokens allocated to Project B is 0.4. Then, each subject has 
to maximize the following payoff function, 
6    . .     , 4 . 0
4
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5 This point of view is suggested by Trimarchi (1993). 
  7 The second treatment, the same for both conditions, is divided into two phases. During phase I, 
subjects are asked to decide whether to allocate an initial endowment of six tokens between two 
projects C and D. They are told that the earnings from project D (zi) will be available at the 
beginning of each period of phase II, directly added up to their initial endowment for that phase
6. 
As stated for project B in the first treatment, the payoff from project C (yi) is the same for each 
member of the same group and it depends on the contribution of all the members to this project.  
 At the end of each period of phase II, subjects have to maximize the following payoff function, 
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Considering the equation in (2), it is important to remind that the term in square brackets represents 
the earnings accruing equally to each member of the group from both of investment in cultural 
education
7 and provision level of cultural goods. In this case, the marginal return accruing to every 
subject from investment in cultural education is 0.3. In order to make the structure of this second 
treatment clear, we introduce Fig.1 which depicts the game tree of the stage game. 
Before moving to analyze the theoretical predictions, we describe the second condition called 
“cultural-context”. The structures of the two treatments, constituting this condition, are exactly 
same as those of the previous treatments. They only differ in the adoption of a loaded wording. 
Table 1 presents a clear description of the changes adopted within this condition, all the other 
features of the treatments remaining the same as in the context-free condition.  
 
                                                 
6 The highest individual endowment for phase II could be 12 tokens. In particular, 6 tokens as earnings from investment 
into project D in phase I plus 6 tokens as initial endowment of phase II given independently from any decisions made 
during phase I.   
7 The investment in cultural education has both a private and a public component. The former is given by the individual 
satisfaction from the art consumption due to the increased skills in arts; the latter is represented by the positive 
externality generated by the higher level of cultural education reached at social level. In this paper, I will only consider 
the public component of cultural education as relevant to my analysis following other contributions in the same field 
(Champarnaud et al., 2002; Fryer, 2002; van der Ploeg, 2002). 
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- Fig.1 - 
 
Cultural-Context   Context-Free 
“private good”  project A 
“cultural good”  project B 
“investment in cultural education”  project C 
“Saving tokens to phase II”  project D 
- Table 1 - 
 
The experiment has been conducted at the Computer Laboratory at the Faculty of Law of the 
University of Catania. A total of 80 subjects have been recruited among a population of students 
from a wide range of studies such as Economics, Law and Political Science. Students could 
participate in only one of the two conditions of the experiment.  
The design of the experimental software has been developed by the ECD staff of the University of 
Catania. At the end of each period, individuals have been informed about their payoffs from their 
own decisions regarding the allocation of their endowment among private good (project A), cultural 
education (project C) and cultural good (project B). Moreover, they have been reminded that their 
payoffs would also be affected by the decisions on investment in cultural education and contribution 
to cultural good made by the other members of the group. Before beginning the experiment, the 
Investment in Cultural Education  
or Project C (yi) 
Initial endowment in Phase II  
((6 + zi) tokens) 
Contribution to 
Cultural Goods  
or Project B (gi) 
Private Good 
Consumption   
or Project A (xi) 
Contribution to 
Cultural Goods 
or Project B (gi) 
Private Good 
Consumption  
or project A (xi) 
Saving tokens to Phase II  
or Project D (zi)  
riding free− π  
Initial endowment in Phase   II 
((6 + zi) tokens) 
Goods Cult Ed Cult No . . .   − π  
Goods ivate Ed Cult   Pr . . − π efficient Pareto− π
Initial endowment in Phase I (6 tokens) 
Phase I
Phase II 
  9instructions have been read aloud and explained in detail. Any kind of communication has been 
forbidden. Subjects typed written responses directly into the computer in their own time. The order 
in which treatments were run varied across the two conditions to control for order effects and any 
effects of repetition. A random rematching protocol has been implemented so that each subject had 
no the chance to play with the same group members more then once. This was done to avoid the 
effects of strategic behaviours. At the end of each condition, subjects were paid anonymously in 
cash at an exchange rate of 0.50 euro per token earned.     
 
3.2 Predictions 
o note is that when there is a positive level of investment in cultural education 
                                                
The first thing t
(project C), the MR from the public good component of (2) increases because of the rise in the 
interest in the provision of cultural goods. In fact, the higher the level of individual cultural 
education is, the higher the intensity of individual sensibility to arts will be. A virtuous circle may 
be closed with a higher rate of contribution to the provision of cultural goods which causes a rise in 
the level of the stock of cultural goods in the society
8 and an increase in the attention to arts. Then, 
new investments in cultural education are expected to take place in order to start the circle again
9. 
This mechanism seems to be able to give a fundamental suggestion on how to capture all the 
positive externalities generated by the investments in cultural education and by the contribution to 
the cultural goods. In fact, every subject investing in cultural education, in the experimental setting, 
contributes to the creation of benefits fully captured by all the members of the group. Although this 
solution seems to be working properly from a theoretical point of view, it poses some questions on 
the ability of individuals in internalizing such benefits and on the effective attitude to invest in 
 
8 The stock of cultural capital presents in a society in every moment is defined as society’s cultural capital by Throsby 
(1999). 
9 A formal description of how this virtuous circle works can be found in Finocchiaro Castro and Mazza (2001). 
  10cultural education
10. The willingness to address these questions has led me to the implementation of 
the experimental design described in section 3.1.  
According to the standard game-theoretic approach, the Nash dominant strategy, obtained applying 
the backward induction procedure, foretells zero investment in cultural education and zero 
contribution to the provision of cultural goods. In other words, each subject should be playing the 
free-riding strategy. However, as showed by several experimental studies on public goods 
provision, the Nash dominant strategy does not coincide with the symmetric Pareto efficient 
solution. The latter suggests that each member of a group has to invest all of her endowment of 
phase I in cultural education and all the resources available in phase II in the provision of cultural 
goods.  
According to the game tree of the stage game described by Fig.1, there are many possible final 
payoffs given the several choices that subjects may make. We will focus only on those four of them 
showed by Fig.1 at the end of the game tree. The first we want to discuss on is the free-riding 
payoff. Each subject is attracted by the chance to gain this profit level not investing anything in 
cultural education and not contributing any tokens to the cultural goods, while the others in the 
group are cooperating. This is the well-known path of choices to be followed by all the self-
interested fully rational subjects. On the other side, it stays the symmetric Pareto efficient payoff. 
This level of profits is achievable only if all the subjects in a group invest their entire endowments 
in both cultural education and cultural goods. In other words, subjects are choosing to fully 
cooperate. In this way, the group as a whole can get the highest possible payoff. The sharp contrast 
between these two payoff levels represents one of the common results from public goods 
experiments (Ladyard, 1995).  
Differently, this work allows for at least other two cases that need some further explanations. The 
first is the case when the members of a group are not so much willing to invest in cultural education 
                                                 
10 In real-life situations, only already “highly educated” people seem to ask for more cultural education because of 
either real interest in the arts or prestige seeking behaviours. 
  11during phase I but they are ready to contribute all of their endowments to the provision of cultural 
goods. There are several possible explanations to justify this pattern of choices.  
First, subjects may feel already enough educated and, then, they prefer to save tokens during phase I 
to contribute more to the provision of cultural goods than subjects investing in cultural education. 
Second, they could be simply not interested in gaining more sensibility to culture and arts but, at the 
same time they want to do “the right thing” contributing to the cultural goods. This motive for 
contributing may be seen as a kind of warm glow emanating from the contribution to the cultural 
goods (Bagnoli and Lipman, 1992; Andreoni, 1990). In this case, subjects are supposed to gain 
utility from the contribution per se with any interest in how it can affect their endowments and in 
the level of the provision of the cultural goods achieved by the group. Third, although being 
cooperators, subjects may not have understood properly the role of investment in cultural education 
as font of positive externality (Andreoni, 1995). 
The last payoff, showed by Fig.1, we want to analyze reflects the case where all the members of a 
group decide to invest all their endowments, available in phase I, into cultural education but they 
contribute very little to the provision of cultural goods. At a first glance, it could seem to be an 
illogic choice. In fact, if a subject is willing to increase her knowledge and sensibility to arts, she 
should be ready to participate to the diffusion of cultural goods in the society. Therefore, we do not 
expect either any self-interested or cooperator subjects, joining the experiments, to undertake this 
pattern of choices unless because of errors or confusion. Nonetheless, moving from game-
theoretical reasoning, there may be people considering being themselves part of an elité when 
spending money and time on cultural education even if they do not care of the provision of cultural 
goods. We control for this prestige-seeking motive not communicating the individual contributions 
to the cultural goods to the other members of the group. In fact, subjects moved by prestige would 
only contribute to the cultural goods if their donations are publicly announced to their peers.  
 
 
  124. The Results 
 
4.1 The effects of Cultural Education 
The first aspect we are going to deal with it will be the effects of investments in cultural education 
on the individual contributions to cultural goods. Clearly, in this case, we avoid the influence of 
framing by comparing the levels of contributions to cultural goods coming from the two treatments 
within one context at time. In this way, we can elicit the differences due only to the presence of 
investments in cultural education. In order to be able to disentangle all the possible influences 
between treatments, we present a table showing the average level of contribution as a percentage of 
the endowment reached along the 10 periods in each treatment. 
 
Period      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
              




62,5 54,2 56,7 55,8 46,7 52,5 49,2 46,7 40,8 39,2
              




61,7 63,3 51,7 35,8 47,5 47,5 38,3 28,3 30,0 33,3
              




46,7 43,3 51,7 47,5 30,0 29,2 17,5 22,5 23,3 14,2




45,7 41,3 47,4 46,1 41,9 31,7 24,3 23,0 25,5 16,5




40,8 37,5 40,8 45,8 46,7 30,0 31,7 26,7 40,8 31,7
              
 Cultural 
Good 
48,4 38,4 40,8 39,8 45,2 29,4 40,1 35,4 45,5 42,5
- Table 2 - 
 
Let us start from the analysis of the data coming from the context-free condition. As shown by Fig.2 
and table 2, the contributions to the cultural good from treatment 1 are always higher than the ones 
from treatment 2, which enables individuals to invest in cultural education. In order to test for the 
significance of this difference we implement the non-paramentric Mann-Whitney test. The value we 
obtain by this test shows that the variations are significant (z = -2.874). The decreasing trends 
  13present in Fig.2 seem to be the same across the treatments, while there is a stronger end-effect in 
treatment 2 than in treatment 1. However, our previsions have been disattended and, moreover, have 
been subverted by the experimental data. Infact, we were expecting to see a higher level of 
contributions, on average, to the cultural good when the subjects have the oppportunity to invest in 
cultural education than when this possibility is not avalaible. It seems like subjects have not noticed 
the eventual positive effect for the whole group coming from investments in cultural education 
before. In particular, in the context-free condition, there cannot have been any influences from the 
framing on the individual contributions to cultural good. I think that cultural education has been 
interpreted as an eventual alternative choice to the contribution to cultural good by subjects. They 
did not get the opportunity to internalize the positive externality for the whole group allocating their 
initial endowment to the cutural education before contributing to the cultural good.  

























T1-context-free T1-cultural-context T2-context-free T2-cultural-context
  
 -Fig.2-   
 
In order to verify more deeply this result, we have run the same test considering the data coming 
from the first period of observation and then considering only the last period’s data. In the first case, 
every single contribution choice represents an indipendent observation because it has been taken 
  14along the first period of the experiment when no influence can affect the choices. The test confirms 
the significance of the difference in contribution levels to the cultural good between the two 
treatments (z = -2.487). Considering the second case, differently, we cannot use the same amount of 
data but we have to adopt the average groups’ contributions during the last period. Also in this 
circumstance, the test is showing the presence of significant differences (z = -2.417). Therefore, 
comparing the levels of contributions to the cultural good, when the context-free is implemented 
there are significant variations between the two treatments.  
If we examine the case of the cultural context, we notice that the Mann-Whitney test does not show 
the presence of any significant difference between the levels of contribution to the cultural good (z 
= -0.302). This means that the possibility of investing in cultural education, during treatment 2, has 
not influenced subjects’ decisions. Also in this case, we have checked for differences in the 
contributions in the first and last period of the condition. The results from the test regarding both of 
the first period (z = -1.794) and the last period (z = -0.943) confirm the whole trend not eliciting any 
significant variations.  
As shown by Fig.2, althought not statistically significant, there are some differences in the patterns 
followed by the contributions made in the two treatments. First of all, it is worth noticing that the 
levels referring to treatment 2 are higher than the ones from treatment 1 in each of the last four 
periods. It may be interpreted as the effect of the investment in cultural education being able to 
boost the contributions to the cultural good. Moreover, the presence of this effect, in the last four 
periods, is showing the interval of time necessary to understand and learn the role of investment in 
cultural education. Second, althought always below the contribution levels of treatment 2 from 
period 8 onward, Fig.2 shows an unusual increase in the contributions during treatment 1. This 
increase in contribution has been noticed in four groups out of five contrasting the well-known end-
effect observed in the other cases. 
 
 
  154.2 The effects of Framing 
In this section, we will investigate the effects due to what we call the cultural context. Those effects 
may be found in both of investments in cultural education and contributions to cultural good across 
the two conditions characterizing our experiment. We can start having a look at the patterns of the 
investments in cultural education across the two contexts. The first thing to be noticed is that the 
values coming from the cultural context are always greater than those of the context-free after 
period 4, althought they both show the usual decreasing trend reflecting the end-effect. This result 
seems to be entirely due to the framing effect that has put in evidence the role of the investment in 
cultural education. Moreover, it is interesting to notice the striking difference in the values of the 
last period: 31.7% in the case of cultural contest and 14.2% in the case of context-free, as showed 
by Fig.3. As done in the previous paragraph, we have checked whether those variations were 
significant through the Mann-Whitney test (z = -0.758) finding that we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis stating that the two groups of observations have the same distribution. As done before, 
we have also checked for significant differences in the first and last period. Regarding the former, 
we have a clear evidence of not significant differences between the two framings (z = -0.989). 
Infact, also graphically, it is possible to see that the values relative to the first period are very close 
each other. In order to assist to a strong increase in the distance between those two lines, we have to 
look at the last two periods. This observation suggests that even a “technical” feature as the change 
in the framing needs some time for its implications to be fully understood by the subjects. This 
consideration is confirmed by the result of the Mann-Whitney test when applied to the last period 
data (z = -2.402). 



























- Fig.3 - 
In this case, there is a significant difference in the values and we can reject the null hypothesis, 
stating that the two contexts differ during the last period. Again graphically, we can notice how 
greater is the value of the cultural context compared to that of the context-free. This aspect validates 
both of the effects of framing in the case of the increase in the investments in cultural education 
when the cultural context is implemented and the fact that this effect requires some periods to be 
fully internalized by subjects.  
Therefore, subjects, on the average, do not seem to immediately understand the game even if we 
introduce a different framing which makes clearer and easier the way to choose the best strategy. 
According to our previsions, having the possibility to make such investments should have helped 
subjects in internalizing the positive externality for their own group originating from both of the 
investments in cultural education and the cultural good provision. In our experiment, it is possible 
to notice that this intuition has been caught by subjects just after period 4 for both of the 
contributions to cultural education and cultural good. 
We can, now, move on to the analysis of the framing effects on the contributions to the cultural 
good, focusing on the differences between the two conditions in order not to mix the effects of 
  17framing with those coming from the presence of investments in cultural education. Then, we 
consider, first, the results coming from treatment 1. As showed by Fig.2, the two lines are both 
decreasing regardless of the context implemented. In the case of cultural context, the level of 
contribution starts from pretty high values (62.5%) and, then, it decreases until period 8 (28.3%). 
Surprisingly, during the last two periods, the level of contributions increases slightly above the 30% 
contrasting the famous end-effect. At a first glance it may seem due to the implementation of the 
cultural context. Anyway, it has to be noticed that the contributions to the cultural good, when using 
loaded instructions, is almost always below the level of the context-free contributions. Therefore, it 
does not seem to be such a framing effect able to explain the rise in the last two periods.  
All the considerations we have formulated can be tested through the Mann-Whitney test which 
confirms that all the differences between the two contexts are not significant (z = -1.362). This 
result is also proved both when considering the first period (z = -0.334) and the last period of the 
experiment (z = -0.862). Although, in the case of cultural context, the instructions have been written 
such in a way to make clear references to the concepts of cultural good and cultural education, we 
have not found any significant variations in the contribution levels during treatment 1. These results 
seem to contrast the common finding of the experimental literature regarding the framing effects 
showed in the previous sections.  
Concluding, we have to analyze the patterns of contributions to cultural goods showed by treatment 
2. Again referring to Fig.3, it is possible to check that the two lines take almost the same values 
until period 6 showing the usual declining trend. The most interesting part comes from period 7 
onward with the steep increase in the contribution to the cultural good in the case of the cultural 
context. In fact, while the context-free case shows a decreasing trend and a clear end-effect in the 
contributions, the level of contributions in the cultural context increases remaining well above the 
one of the context-free and presenting a light end-effect in the last period only. 
Therefore, we can check, using the Mann-Whitney test, for the presence of significant differences 
between groups of observations not finding any significant difference (z = -0.756). We get the same 
  18result when we consider the observations coming from the first period only (z = -0.666). However, 
if we check for the last two periods of observations, the differences are all significant (z9 = -2.193; 
z10 = -2.402)
11.  
Therefore, the effect of framing seems to be focused on the last periods of the experiment where the 
differences in contributions become significant. This behaviour may imply the fact that subjects 
required a quite long period of time in order to understand the benefits coming from cooperation. 
Nevertheless, it seems peculiar that, given such a clear and straight reference to cultural goods in 
the instructions, the effect of framing has started so late. Further research is required to analyze 
more in depth the role of framing when a cultural context is implemented. 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Our main aim has been to answer to two questions. First, if the possibility of investing a portion of 
the initial endowment in cultural education may affect the individual levels of contribution to the 
cultural good. Second, if the adoption of different framing along the experiment may have 
influenced subjects’ contributions.  
Considering the first question and focusing on the context-free framing, the cultural education does 
not seem to have caused any increase in the contributions to the cultural good. Moreover, the values 
regarding the treatment 1, which does not include the investments in cultural education, are always 
much greater that the ones of treatment 2. This result has subverted our previsions regarding the 
positive effects of cultural education on the contributions to the cultural good. Most likely, the 
possibility to gain higher earnings for the own group has not been either understood or exploited by 
                                                 




  19subjects. Differently, in the case of cultural context, we did not find any significant differences in 
the contribution levels to cultural good. Anyway, it is interesting to notice that treatment 1 does not 
show the common end-effect, most probably because of the peculiar context implemented. 
Regarding the second question, our first result shows that a change in the framing did not have any 
effect either on the investments in cultural education, except in the last period, or on the 
contributions to the cultural good in the case of treatment 1. A more interesting result concerns the 
case of treatment 2. Infact, the framing seems to have a strong effect only on the last two periods, 
while it does not show any significant effect on the rest of the periods. Such an effect appears to be 
completely due to the adoption of the cultural context although we have to underline the amount of 
time that subjects have surprisingly required to increase the cooperation. Therefore, it seems that, 
even if implementing a clear and direct context such a cultural one, individuals are not affected 
enough by the context so to increase the level of cooperation from the beginning of the experiment.  
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